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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Exclusion of Negroes From 
Dental Society That Controls Selection of 
State Dental Officials Violates the Equal 
Protection Clause-Hawkins v. North 
Carolina Dental Society* 
Plaintiff, a licensed Negro dentist, was refused admission to the 
North Carolina Dental Society,1 a voluntary professional organi-
zation that plays a significant role both in the selecting of state 
dental officials and in the promotion of state dental programs.2 
• 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 322 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 
the principal case]. 
I. Plaintiff was also excluded from the Second District Dental Society which is a 
regional component of the North Carolina Dental Society. Membership in the former 
is a prerequisite to membership in the latter. There are no Negroes in either society, 
and the plaintiff was unable to obtain the necessary recommendations. Principal case 
at 719. 
2. These programs include: (1) raising funds to create a scientific foundation for 
research and study in dentistry at the University of North Carolina School of Dentistry; 
(2) inspecting hospitals to determine whether their facilities are suitable for the teaching 
and training of dentistry; and (3) promulgation of fee schedules for use by the state's 
industrial commission. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 
808 (W.D.N.C. 1964). 
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At the time the plaintiff sought admission to the Society, state 
statutes empowered the Society to elect the six members of the 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners3 and to designate the 
dental representatives to the Medical Care Commission4 and the 
Mental Health Council.5 After the plaintiff brought suit to compel 
his admission to the Society, the Society persuaded the state legisla-
ture to amend these statutes so that any licensed dentist can be nom-
inated for election to the Board of Dental Examiners by a petition 
signed by at least ten dentists. 6 The amendments further provided 
that the Governor, rather than the Society, shall appoint the dental 
representatives to the Medical Care Commission and the Mental 
Heal th Council, after requesting recommendations from the Society. 7 
In light of these changes in the statutes, the federal district court 
decided to dismiss the suit since the Society no longer had any legal 
control over the selection of the state's dental officials and the mere 
voluntary participation of a private organization in state programs 
is not sufficient to constitute state action.8 On appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, reversed. Since the amend-
ments had not changed the Society's practical control over the selec-
tion of state dental officials9 and since the Negro dentist was still, 
for all practical purposes, without a voice in state dental programs, 
the Society's discriminatory exclusion of the plaintiff was deemed 
state action violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
The principal case is one of the few instances where a court has 
used the fourteenth amendment to examine the conduct of profes-
sional organizations.10 Although the amendment states that no 
"State ... [shall] deny to any person ... the equal protection of the 
laws ... ," the courts have liberally construed the term "State" so 
as to afford greater protection to individual rights.11 Consequently, 
3. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 90-22 (1958). 
4. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 131-117 (1958). 
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-105 (1958). 
6. N.C. Laws, 1961, ch. 213 (April 13, 1961). 
7. N.C. Laws, 1963, chs. 325, 326 (May 1, 1963). 
8. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 811 (W.D.N.C. 1964). 
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22 (1965) makes it theoretically possible for any licensed, 
nonmember dentist to become a member of the State :Board of Dental Examiners. 
However, there have been three elections subsequent to the passage of this statute in 
which a total of seven nominees, all members of the Society, ran for six vacancies on 
the Board. Four of these were declared elected without the formality of an election. 
Principal case at 720. 
10. In :Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964), the activities 
of defendant organization, which had been empowered by the state legislature to nomi-
nate members to state regulatory boards from which the Governor made appointments, 
were deemed to be state action and therefore within the fourteenth amendment. 
11. See generally Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: 
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1961); Horowitz, The Misleading 
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in addition to the direct acts of the state itself,12 state action now 
includes all acts of administrative agencies13 and officials14 and the 
operation of public facilities.15 The activity of private individuals16 
which takes place on property leased17 or conveyed18 by the state or 
which is extensively financed or controlled19 by the state may also 
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 
(1957); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); St. Antoine, 
Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and 
"Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Comment, 50 CORNELL 
L.Q. 473 (1965); Co=ent, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private 
Organizations, 61 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1948); Co=ent, 6 VILL. L. REv. 218 (1961). 
12. Acts of the state which violate the fourteenth amendment include: (1) legislative 
enactment, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (statute provided for 
segregation of public schools); (2) executive action, see, e.g., Screws v. United States, 
325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sheriff beating prisoner to death); (3) judicial action, see, e.g., 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (cases 
involving judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based on race). 
13. Howe Tel. &: Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
14. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Fle=ing v. South Carolina Elec. &: Gas 
Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956); Crews v. United 
States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947). 
15. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam); Mayor &: City 
Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam). A state may, however, close or sell 
its facilities and such a sale may not necessarily constitute state action under the four-
teenth amendment. City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960); City 
of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957). 
16. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951) where the Court left open the 
possibility that the activities of very large private organizations might in some instances 
violate the fourteenth amendment despite the lack of state involvement. 
17. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Derrington v. 
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Smith v. City 
of Birmingham, 226 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Nash v. Air Terminal Serv. Inc., 85 
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949); Kem v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940). 
But cf. Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953). 
18. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (conveyance of a 
fee by the city with a possibility of reverter); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 
336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964) (conveyance by the city of the total fee but control reserved 
over the grantee's operations by the insertion of restrictive covenants in the deed). 
19. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (activity closely scrutinized 
and approved by a public utilities co=ission); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (hospital recevied federal funds pursuant to the 
Hill Burton program and was subject to a comprehensive scheme of regulation); Kerr 
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945) 
(privately endowed library received 99% of its total operating funds from the city); 
see Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964). It is difficult to determine e.xactly the 
amount of aid or control that are necessary to render the recipient's activities state 
action. The cases indicate, however, that even though the state grants a reasonable 
amount of aid in good faith, the recipient will not necessarily be subject to the 
sanctions of the fourteenth amendment. See Norris v. Mayor &: City Council, 78 F. Supp. 
451 (D. Md. 1948); cf. Dorsey v. Styvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (state aid consisted of tax exemptions and the 
power of eminent domain). In Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 
F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957), the court held that there was no state action although the 
defendant was permitted to use the city's playground facilities without cost and retain 
the services of city policemen for special duties. Contra, Statom v. Board of Comm'rs, 
233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1963). Builders who have homes insured by the FHA cannot 
be enjoined under the Constitution if they refuse to sell homes to Negroes solely on the 
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fall within its purview. Further extensions of the concept of state 
action have brought within the scope of the amendment private 
organizations when such organizations exercise practical control over 
activities which are normally performed by the state. These or-
ganizations are said to be performing state or public functions,20 
so that, pursuant to the public function doctrine, their private 
identity is lost and they are considered an arm of the state. 
In its statement of the facts, the court in the principal case in-
dicated that there were two closely related factors which brought 
the Society's action under the fourteenth amendment. First, even 
under the statutes as amended, the Governor must request recom-
mendations from the Society before he makes his appointments to 
the Medical Care and Mental Health Commissions. While these 
recommendations are not binding on the Governor, nevertheless, 
the state has officially delegated to the Society the responsibility of 
making them. Although it could be argued that this fact alone is 
sufficient to justify regarding the Society as an organization which 
performs a state function, such a position would pose difficult prob-
lems if the statutory requirement for recommendations were re-
moved but the Governor voluntarily requested advice or recom-
mendations from the Society. Since the court was aware of the pos-
sibility of the removal of the requirement for recommendations20a 
and since it was apparently unwilling to say that the mere fact that an 
individual influenced state action was sufficient to subject the indi-
basis of race. Johnson v. Levitt 8: Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955). Contra, Ming 
v. Horgan, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958). 
20. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); 
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948). There is 
presently a conflict in the lower courts as to how far the public function concept 
should be extended in order to limit private activities under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See :Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961); lloman v. Birmingham 
Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). But cf. Dorsey v. Styvesant Town Corp., 299 
N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (a private developer was 
not bound by the fourteenth amendment to follow a nondiscriminatory rental policy 
despite the fact that its development was the equivalent of a normal city). 
One problem that has troubled the courts is the granting of powers or privileges 
by the state to a private party. In Steele v. Louisville 8: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), 
the Supreme Court held that a labor union which serves as the exclusive bargaining 
agent for a class of railroad employees under the Railway Labor Act has a statutory 
duty to represent fairly union and non-union employees at the collective bargaining 
table without discrimination because of race. See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957); :Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Betts v. Easley, 
161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). However, the granting of a license by the state to 
operate a restaurant has not been regarded as sufficient to constitute state action. 
Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); see Bell v. 
Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964). 
20a. The court's fears were in fact borne out, for at the next session of the legis-
lature, the statutes were amended so as to provide that the Governor is not required 
to request recommendations from the Society. 
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vidual to the fourteenth amendment, the court was not content to 
rest its decision solely on the statutory authorization to make recom-
mendations. 
The second factor relied on by the court in the principal case is 
that, despite the statutory revisions, the Society, as a practical matter, 
continued to control the appointment of state dental officials. That 
the existence of practical control had led courts to find state action 
in activity which is not otherwise within the fourteenth amendment 
is illustrated by several recent cases. First, consider the white pri-
mary cases where, as in the principal case, post-litigation statutory 
changes were made in an attempt to insulate the discriminatory 
activity from the limitations imposed upon state action. The voting 
controversy began when Texas statutes which prohibited Negroes 
from voting in the Democratic Primary were declared unconstitu-
tional in that they violated the fourteenth amendment.21 Subse-
quently, the Democratic Party, attempting to achieve the same 
result, utilized its own discriminatory rules to keep Negroes from 
voting in its primary. However, the Supreme Court, in Smith v. 
Allwright,22 found that the Party's activity constituted state action 
since the primary was an integral part of the elective process con-
ducted under state statutory authority.23 Finally, in Terry v. 
Adams,24 the Court found that private elections which were con-
ducted by a county-wide organization known as the Jaybird Associ-
ation also constituted state action, for despite the fact that the Asso-
ciation was not in any way regulated by the state and had no formal 
relationship with the Democratic Party, the winner of the Jaybird 
election as a practical matter almost always became the Democratic 
nominee.25 It is arguable that Terry might be distinguished from 
the principal case since the former was decided under the fifteenth 
amendment, in which the state action concept is arguably subject 
to a broader construction,26 but the following two cases, both of 
which were decided on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, also 
indicate the importance of the private entity's practical control of 
21. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). Texas then enacted a statute that em-
powered the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party to prescribe qualifica-
tions for the party members. The Supreme Court held in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 
73 (1932), that since this committee derived its powers from the state and not the 
party, its actions were subject to the sanctions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments, 
22, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
23. The Allwright decision overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), in 
which it was held that the Democratic Party's exclusion of Negroes, absent any 
participation by the state, did not constitute state action. 
24. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
25. Id. at 484, 493 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
26. For an analysis of state action under the fifteenth amendment, see Note, 74 
YALE L.J. 1448 (1965). • 
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state activities. In Marsh v. Alabama,27 the Supreme Court held that 
a Jehovah's Witness who distributed religious literature on the streets 
of a privately owned town could not be prosecuted for trespass. The 
Court emphasized that the services and functions performed by any 
town are the same, whether the town be publicly or privately con-
trolled. Finally, Evans v. Newton28 is also relevant, for in Evans, the 
Court held that a privately owned park, devised to a town and sub-
sequently transferred to a private trustee, could not be operated on 
a segregated basis. While the Court's reasoning was based in part on 
the fact that the park remained under municipal control and con-
tinued to receive tax exemptions, the underlying rationale was that 
the inherently public nature generally associated with all parks re-
quired a policy of non-discrimination even by a privately owned 
park. Although Terry, Marsh and Evans support the decision in the 
principal case, in that they rely on practical control, it is noteworthy 
that in each of these cases, the sole purpose of the private organiza-
tion was the performance of a public function whereas in the 
principal case, the professional organization did engage in many 
private as well as public activities. It may be argued that the prin-
cipal case goes beyond prior authority, but, given the fact that an 
organization performs a public function, its non-public activities 
are irrelevant so long as exclusion from the organization excludes 
one from participating in the public activity. 
Unless a cause of action is based on a violation of a constitutional 
right, the courts have been reluctant to interfere with the member-
ship policies of professional organizations.29 While this approach 
originally received wide support, the increasing amount of economic 
and political power wielded by these organizations has caused the 
courts to respond favorably to the argument that judicial interven-
tion in the affairs of professional organizations may be necessary in 
order to protect an individual, despite the fact that the organiza-
tional activities are free from constitutional attack.30 At the present 
27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
28. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
29. The Pluralists, headed by J. N. Figgis and Harold Laski, were the chief pro-
ponents of the idea that all private organizations should enjoy freedom from inter-
ference by the State. See Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. R.Ev. 404, 
418-19 (1916). Regardless of the effect of arbitrary exclusion on one's economic and 
social interests, there is no legally enforceable right to become a member of a pro-
fessional organization. Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala. 1!15, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944); 
Harris v. Thomas, 21'7 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). When a member has been 
wrongfully expelled, however, the courts may intervene on the theory that the expelled 
member has suffered a loss of property rights, Dawkins v. Antrobus, l'l Ch. D. 615 
(1881), or on the theory that the organization has breached a contract between itself 
and the expelled member, Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 17'7 N.E. 833 (1931). 
30. See MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND nm CONSI'lTUTION (1959). See generally 
Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of PriV{lte Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 
983 (1963). 
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time, there are two situations which may prompt the courts to inter-
vene: when membership is required by state law31 and when mem-
bership is a prerequisite to an individual's livelihood.32 For example, 
in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society,33 a licensed osteo-
path was denied admission to the county medical society34 and 
consequently was unable to serve on the staffs of private hospi-
tals which were required by the American Hospital Association to 
employ only licensed doctors who were in good standing in their 
local medical societies. Since the osteopath's exclusion from the 
society prevented him, for all practical purposes, from practicing 
medicine and substantially impaired his livelihood, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court required the county society to admit him. The Fal-
cone decision represented a significant departure from the tradi-
tional treatment of private and professional organizations, but it 
was not totally without precedent85 and its rationale has been 
adopted in other states.36 Although the facts of Falcone are far more 
compelling than those of the principal case,37 the concern with the 
power of professional organizations which provoked the Falcone 
decision may have influenced the court in the principal case and 
prompted it to extend the concept of state action so as to be able 
to require the admission of the plaintiff to the North Carolina Den-
tal Society. 
31. People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. • 187 (1865). 
!12. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); 
see Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1186 (1962); Note, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 327 (1961); Note, 74 
YALE L.J. 1!113 (1965); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963). 
!l!I. !14 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). 
34. It should be noted that New Jersey is one of the very few states where the 
Board of Medical Examiners licenses both medical doctors and osteopathic physicians. 
Plaintiff received his degree from a school that was not approved by the A.M.A. because 
it did not grant a medical degree, but rather it granted a degree of osteopathy. The 
local society would not admit plaintiff since it followed the A.M.A. practice of limiting 
its membership to doctors of medicine. The hospitals could not accept plaintiff's 
services, since they would have lost accreditation from the A.M.A. 
!15. First, it appears that other organizations similar to the one in Falcone do not 
have a constitutional right to discriminate on the basis of race with regard to member-
ship policies. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). Second, a labor union that 
has a closed shop agreement with an employer may not arbitrarily exclude Negroes 
from its membership in order to prevent them from obtaining employment. James v. 
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944). Contra, Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 
52!1, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957). See also Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d 
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953). 
36. See Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964); 
Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 
Kurk v. Queen's County Medical Soc'y, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Where sub• 
stantial harm other than economic injury is shown, admission will not be compelled. 
Salter v. New York State Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 248 N.Y.S.2d 864, 198 
N.E,2d 250 (1964). 
!17. The district court in the principal case rejected evidence that membership in 
the society was a prerequisite to practice in the Charlotte Memorial Hospital. Brief 
for Appellant, p. 10. Had this evidence been admitted, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit might have based its result on the rationale of Falcone. 
